



EUNPACK

A CONFLICT SENSITIVE UNPACKING OF
THE EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
TO CONFLICT AND CRISES MECHANISM

Policy Brief summarizing perception studies in Afghanistan

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Assessment of EU's Response in Afghanistan:

**Did EU's conflict response through EUPOL deliver as it intended:
A review of how EU in general and EUPOL in particular were
received and perceived among Afghan stakeholders in Kabul**

**EUNPACK Paper
Chona Echavez and Qayoom Suroush ¹**

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Key Points and Recommendations

Key Points

A total of 300 respondents from three categories with 100 each, namely: people in the community with EUPOL trained police assigned in the area, stakeholders from implementing ministries, and police officers involved or who were mentored/trained by EUPOL.

- Most of the respondents were aware of international actors involved in crisis response. However, it was noted that that people from the community with EUPOL trained police had lower awareness compared with the rest.
- There was a general perception among stakeholders interviewed that EU officials, state officials, and the military disproportionately benefitted from the support of the EU crisis response. Very few respondents reported that support was extended to population in need such as the minorities, poor people, disabled, migrants (refugees and IDPs), children, students, refugees, and orphans. It is also to be noted that more than half of the respondents who were aware of EU's crisis response claimed that non-state armed actors are also benefiting from this support.
- Respondents gave a "neutral" answer when asked about their satisfaction with the EU support and almost half from the community answered that they "do not know," or they cannot give an assessment.
- The majority of the community residents where trained EUPOL police were assigned were not aware of EUPOL.
- Overall satisfaction of the pillars of the mission is modest. Implicit in the data is the high degree of ambivalence and or uncertainty by the respondents. Across all categories of respondents, the percentage of "Don't Know" is quite high in all six pillars of the mission

Recommendations

Policy Recommendations:

1. Invest in public awareness programs to inform people and dispel misconceptions of what the EU programme is all about.
2. Establish if not enhance existing information, education and communication campaign towards the involvement of stakeholders at various levels, specifically at the community toward involvement in EU programs and projects.
3. Design long-term programmes rather than short-term ones with clear short-term and long-term outcomes.
4. Establish a strong mechanism of gathering evidence based-data prior to (baseline), during (monitoring), after the implementation (end-line) and impact of EU programmes and projects.



Background: EU Police Mission in Afghanistan

The European Union with the Member States committed itself to Afghanistan and its government as a key donor of an approximately EUR 8 billion for the period 2002-2010. With the collaboration with international partners, EU took on a major role in the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts.² Going back to history, after the overthrow of the Taliban rule in 2001, the international community along with various Afghan political elite groups attended the UN talks in the Bonn agreement determined the establishment of the Afghan interim government and also the deployment of international military forces to help the new administration in keeping the security of Kabul and other provinces. EU and its member states agreed to assist the government of Afghanistan in establishing a sturdy framework of the rule of law in the country.³

At the G8 conference in Geneva in April 2002, the donor community came up with reform program base on a "lead nation framework" to deal with such security issues. Under "lead nation framework" the security sector was segregated into five pillars. Among these five countries assigned to supervise and support the reforms for each pillar were Germany was assigned for the training of Afghan Police forces; Japan had the responsibility for the process of demilitarisation, disarmament, and reintegration. Italy was consigned to the emendation of the justice system and prosecution process. The United Kingdom took responsibility for combating drugs and training of Afghan counter-narcotics forces, and the United States was committed to building Afghan National Army⁴. The "lead nation approach" in 2005 had attenuated, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) became the genuine leader within the international community for supporting and developing the security sector in Afghanistan. The EU and its member states committed themselves to assist the government of Afghanistan in establishing a stronger framework of the rule of law in the country.⁵

EUPOL was set up in 2007 to assist the Afghan government in reforming its police service. EUPOL was aimed to contribute to the formation of viable, sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, under Afghan ownership that would guarantee proper interaction with the wider criminal justice system. EUPOL intended to build on the efforts of the German Police Project Office to coordinate the approaches and efforts of the various partners involved in the police reform.⁶

² "European Union Council Secretariat Factsheet EU Engagement in Afghanistan." January 2010. Retrieved from <https://goo.gl/NCLvLc>

³ Tim Youngs, *Afghanistan: the culmination of the Bonn Process*, Research paper 05/72 House of Common Library, 25 OCT 2017, Retrieved from: <https://goo.gl/x9oKwp> (Accessed last: 28 SEP 2017).

⁴ Geoffy Hayes and Mark Sedra, *Afghanistan: Transition under threat*, WLUP, P.194, 2008, Retrieved from: https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_transition_under_threat_0.pdf (Accessed last: 28 Sep 2017)

⁵ European Court of Auditors, *The EU police mission in Afghanistan: mixed results*, Special report, Luxembourg, 2015, Retrieved from: http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR15_07/SR_EUPOL_AFGHANISTAN_EN.pdf (Accessed Last: 28 Sept 2017).

⁶ European Union, *EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)*, Common Security and Defense Policy, October 2011, Retrieved from: <https://goo.gl/gjnK3Q>, (Accessed last: 28 Sept 2017).



The EUPOL mission had three phases; the first phase started from 2007 to 2009, followed by the second phase from 2009 to 2003 and third and final phase from 2013 to end of 2016. The EUPOL mission provided training, advising and monitoring to the senior leadership of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), Afghan Police, Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Attorney General's Office (AGO)⁷. The estimated budget of EUPOL in Afghanistan from 2007-2016 was around €457 million. EUPOL implements its mandate in Afghanistan along three lines of operations: the line of Operation 1: Advancing institutional reform of the Ministry of the Interior; the line of Operation 2: Professionalising the national police; and the line of Operation 3: Connecting the national police to the wider justice system.

Methodology:

This policy brief is an outcome of the quantitative study that utilised a survey technique with quota sampling procedure of 300 respondents from three categories (100 respondents per category who were randomly selected) based on the respondents' involvement of EUPOL in Afghanistan. These three categories included the people in the community with EUPOL trained police assigned in their area, the beneficiaries who are the police officers benefiting from EUPOL, and the stakeholders of ministries who served as partners in the EUPOL implementation. For the community participants, 100 residents were randomly selected surrounding the Kabul Police District 3 where EUPOL trained police were assigned. Then AREU team surveyed 8 zones with 12+ randomly selected in each zone and attempted to have an equal inclusion of men and women as respondents. The beneficiaries' category, AREU's respondents, were the Afghan National Police's officers and a small number of the staff at Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and Office of Attorney General (OAG) who had been trained by EUPOL. The rationale behind a small number of respondents at MOJ and OAG is that the Afghan National Police was the main focus of EUPOL. It only trained a few at MOJ and OAG. Hence, the inclusion of 13 people from the MOJ and 9 persons from OAG as respondents. The rest of the questionnaires (78) were conducted with those departments of the ANP, which the EUPOL worked with them. These departments include Afghan National Civil Order Police, Afghan Border Police, Fire Fighting Police, and Special Force Police.

The stakeholders included the heads of departments, senior staff and training centres at MOI who were EUPOL partners for implementing its projects. AREU has used Census and Survey Processing System (CSPRO) for data entries and Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) for data processing. The data were processed through frequencies and percentages.

Findings:

As to the profile of the respondents (Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c) involved in the study, out of the 300 respondents, 7 in 10 are males. The highest percentage of male respondents are the Stakeholder from implementing ministries (81.4%), followed by the Police Officers involved/benefiting from EUPOL (72.4%). In terms of age, 23.0 percent are 18 - 25; 41.0 percent are 26 - 39 years old, 34.0 percent are 40 - 60 years old, and 2.0 percent are over 60 years old.

⁷ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003 p. 23, Retrieved from: <http://bookfi.org/book/1112316>, (Accessed April 22, 2013)



Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1c. Selected profiles (sex, age, ethnicity, and a number of years in the school of respondents (percentage).




Fig. 1-a. Sex




Fig. 1-b. Age




Fig. 1-c. Ethnicity




Fig. 1-d. Number of years in school

The Stakeholders from implementing agencies and the Police Officers involved/benefiting from EUPOL are generally older than the respondents from communities with EUPOL trained Police. The Tajiks predominate (61.9%) predominates all other ethnic groups. Most of the respondents were educated, especially those coming from the police force who were involved in the EUPOL and those from the implementing agencies but almost a quarter of those coming from communities had no education and had difficulty understanding everyday written materials.

Overall, 7 in 10 of all respondents knew of any international actor involved in crisis response in Afghanistan. Fig. 2 shows that stakeholders from the implementing ministries have rated highest of their level of awareness, followed by the police officers and the people in the community.




Figure 3 depicts the top three most known international actors engaged in crisis response in Afghanistan, namely, EU (99.4%), UN (70.6%), and US (59.3%).




Fig 3. International actors identified who are involved in crisis response in the country (percentage)



As to the awareness of the EU crisis response, Fig. 4 shows that overall, the top two highest are the "Capacity Building" (80.4%), "Development Aid" (70.2%), and the lowest is the "Rule of Law" (48.9).




Fig 4. Awareness of respondents of type of EU crisis response (percentage)




Fig 5. Professional/voluntary involvement in crisis response in the country by respondent category (percentage)

Pertaining to the "Professional/voluntary involvement in crisis response in the country by respondent category, Fig. 5 depicts that 67.6 percent of all respondents are involved in crisis response in the country. The highest percentage of those who reported that they are professionally/voluntarily involved in crisis response were the Police Officers involved/benefiting from EUPOL (86.3%) and the Stakeholders from Implementing Ministries (72.5%). This is understandable as it is related to their work.

Less than half of the respondents from communities with EUPOL trained police reported that they are professionally/voluntarily involved in crisis response. There is not much involvement at the community level.

The implicit general perception that supports disproportionately benefited EU officials (78.1%), State officials (77.6%), and the military (77.2%) (Figure 6). On the one hand, very few respondents reported that support was extended to the population in need such as the minorities, migrants and refugees, and orphans. Among the EU officials, the category of "Police Officers Involved/Benefiting from EUPOL."

Among those who are aware of EU crisis response, most respondents reported as "neutral" when asked about their satisfaction level with the EU support. However, another means of analysis can be done, and that is by comparing the percentage who reported they are dissatisfied as against the percentage of respondents who reported that they are satisfied. There is about the same percentage of respondents who express dissatisfaction and who express satisfaction with the EU support.

As to the respondents who are aware of EU crisis response, they claimed that some more needs to be done to improve such intervention. Overall, approximately 63 percent believed that that EU's intervention is conflict sensitive, while 35 percent of all respondents claimed that the intervention is not conflict sensitive (Figure 7).




Fig. 6. Beneficiaries of crisis support as reported by respondents by category (percentage)




Fig. 7. Respondents' description of EU's intervention (percentage)

From EU's crisis response in general, respondents were asked as to their awareness and knowledge of EUPOL in particular, 77 percent are aware of EUPOL. The highest among Police Officers involved/benefiting from EUPOL (95.9%), followed by the stakeholders from implementing Ministries (85.0) and lowest among people in the community with EUPOL trained Police. The data suggest that some more needs to be done to increase awareness about the mission. While awareness is highest among Police Officers involved/benefiting from EUPOL, it begs the question why the remaining 4.1 percent of Police Officers who directly benefit from the mission reported no awareness about it. The same may also be said of the respondents from the community with EUPOL Trained Police where over half reported not being aware of the mission (Fig. 8).




Fig. 8. Respondents' awareness and knowledge about EUPOL (percentage)

The data show that only 27.8 percent of all respondents were highly aware of the program, 35.5 percent were aware, while the remaining 36.7 percent reported being slightly aware of the program. The data further show that the level of awareness about the program is lowest among the respondents from the communities with EUPOL Trained Police. The data further show that less than half (41.4%) of the Police Officers involved/ benefiting from EUPOL reported having a high level of awareness about the mission.

What is known by the respondents about the mission? The data show that “*Strengthening gender and HR aspects within Afghan National Police*” is known by 78.7 of the 169 respondents who had some knowledge of the mission. The second most known information about the mission is “*Police-justice cooperation*” which is known by 75.7 percent, followed by



“Police command, control, and communications” which is known by 53.8 percent of the respondents who reported to have some knowledge about EUPOL. The data further show that “Intelligence-led policing” is the least known (30.2%) information about EUPOL (Fig. 9).




Fig. 9. Knowledge of respondents about EUPOL

Among the Police Officers involved/benefiting from EUPOL, the information on “Intelligence-led policing” is the least known (27.1%) information while “Police-justice cooperation” is the most known (87.1%) followed by “Strengthening gender and HR aspects within Afghan National Police” (80.0%).

The “Implementation of anti-corruption strategy” is consistently the least known information about EUPOL by the respondents from communities with EUPOL trained police and the stakeholders from implementing ministries. The data show that only

29.0 percent of the respondents from communities with EUPOL trained Police and 29.4 percent of the stakeholders from implementing ministries reported of knowing that the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy is part of EUPOL.

“Strengthening gender and HR aspects within Afghan National Police” on the one hand is the most known information about EUPOL by the respondents from communities with EUPOL trained police and the stakeholders from implementing ministries. The data show that 77.4 percent of the respondents from communities with EUPOL trained police and 77.9 percent of the stakeholders from implementing ministries have known of this particular program pursued by EUPOL.

On Overall satisfaction of the pillars of the mission is modest. Implicit in the data is the high degree of ambivalence and or uncertainty by the respondents. Across all categories of respondents, the percentage of “Don’t Know” is quite high in all six pillars of the mission




Fig 10. Respondents' perception of the condition after EUPOL mission in Afghanistan

Implicit in the data is the high degree of ambivalence and/or uncertainty by the respondents. Particularly, across all three categories of respondents, the percentage of “Don’t Know” responses is quite high in all six Pillars of the mission.

Figure 10 shows that the respondents who had some knowledge about EUPOL believed that mission was instrumental in improving their lot. Particularly, 80.6 percent of the 165 respondents who reported to have some knowledge about the mission believed they would be better-off after the EUPOL mission in the country while only 5.5 percent said that they would be worse-off and 4.8 percent



said they do not know. The data further show that 9.1 percent of the 165 respondents who had some knowledge of EUPOL believed that the mission made little headway (i.e., the situation is just about the same) in improving their lot.

Conclusion:

- There is an existing gap in the knowledge about EU and its specific program (EUPOL) at the community level. Hence, the majority of the respondents from the community could not assess their satisfaction with the EU support.
- A general perception among stakeholders interviewed that EU officials, state officials, and the military benefited hugely from the support of EU crisis response. Non-state armed actors are also identified as benefiting from the support. Those who are in need (such as migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons, children, disabled, students, and orphans) are not benefited from the support of the EU crisis response.
- Police officers who were involved and were benefited from EUPOL cannot relate or do not know much on the pillars on intelligence policing and implementation of the anti-corruption strategy.
- A high degree of ambivalence or uncertainty by the respondents when asked about their satisfaction of the pillars of the mission in all categories as the percentage of “Don’t Know” is quite high in all six pillars of the mission.

Policy Recommendations:

1. **Investing in Public Awareness Programs:** The survey shows that local communities have very limited knowledge about EU and its programs. They even suspect that some assistance of the EU’s end up in the hands of insurgents. Moreover, some of the police officers who at some point have been trained by EUPOL or its partners, do not know about the EU’s mission and involvement in Afghanistan. Greater awareness would result in greater participation and involvement of the people from the ground. Tapping the power of mass media and social networking to inform people from various levels, specifically at the community level again for an informed and involved citizenry.
2. **Establishing or Enhancing Existing Information, Education and Communication Campaign toward Community Involvement in EU-Programmes and Projects.** The campaigns can be anchored on implementing government or nongovernment

organisations. The campaign can be anchored on the government and/or non-government organizations to mobilize involvement of people at various levels in EU programmes and projects.



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3. **Designing Long-Term Program Rather Than Short-Term Ones with Clear Short-term and Long-term Outcomes:** Successfully implementing a sustainable strategy requires measuring outcomes of success with longer time horizon as external factors and challenges are longer term than short-term in nature. Sustainability mechanism can be put in place. Even the police officers who were the recipient of the EUPOL's programmes could not remember what those were. Refresher courses to prop up knowledge and skills acquired from the capacity building activities undertaken need to be programmed.

4. **A Strong Mechanism of Gathering Evidence-based Data Prior to (baseline), During (monitoring) and After the Implementation (end-line) and impact of EU Programmes and Projects.** Baseline data are established, and effective monitoring and evaluation and learning process put in place to measure short-term outcomes and long-term impacts of the programme.



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